Bayesian Ingredients: A brief introduction

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## Outline

Bayesian paradigm: an overview

Example 1: Is Diego ill? Adding some modeling X = 1 is observed Bayesian learning

Example 2: Gaussian measurement error

Large and small prior experience Bayesian computation: predictive Bayesian computation: posterior A small computational problem

Monte Carlo: a toy example

# Bayesian paradigm: an overview

Combination of different sources/levels of information

- Sequential update of beliefs
- A single, coherent framework for
  - Statistical inference/learning
  - Model comparison/selection/criticism
  - Predictive analysis and decision making
- Drawback: Computationally challenging

# Example 1: Is Diego ill?

Diego claims some discomfort and goes to his doctor.

His doctor believes he might be ill (he may have the flu).

- $\theta = 1$ : Diego is ill.
- $\theta = 0$ : Diego is not ill.

 $\blacktriangleright$   $\theta$  is the "state of nature" or "proposition"

The doctor can take a binary and imperfect "test" X in order to learn about  $\theta$ :

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} P(X=1|\theta=0)=0.40, & \mbox{false positive} \\ P(X=0|\theta=1)=0.05, & \mbox{false negative} \end{array} \right.$$

These numbers might be based, say, on observed frequencies over the years and over several hospital in a given region.

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The doctor performs the test and observes X = 1.

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X = 1 is more likely from a ill patient than from a healthy one

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The maximum likelihood estimator of  $\theta$  is  $\hat{\theta}_{MLE} = 1$ .

# Bayesian learning

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#### Overall rate of positives

The doctor can anticipate the overall rate of positive tests:

$$P(X = 1) = P(X = 1|\theta = 0)P(\theta = 0)$$
  
+  $P(X = 1|\theta = 1)P(\theta = 1)$   
=  $(0.4)(0.3) + (0.95)(0.7) = 0.785$ 

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Correct answer:  $P(\theta = 1 | X = 1)$ 

Simple probability identity (Bayes' rule):

$$P(\theta = 1 | X = 1) = P(\theta = 1) \left\{ \frac{P(X = 1 | \theta = 1)}{P(X = 1)} \right\}$$
  
= 0.70 ×  $\frac{0.95}{0.785}$   
= 0.70 × 1.210191  
= 0.8471338

Combining both pieces of information

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existing information (prior) + model/data (likelihood) the updated (posterior) probability that Diego is ill is 85%. Combining both pieces of information

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More generally,

 $\texttt{posterior} = \frac{\texttt{prior} \times \texttt{likelihood}}{\texttt{predictive}}$ 

What if instead X = 0?

Maximum likelihood:

X = 0 is more likely from a healthy patient than from an ill one

$$\frac{P(X=0|\theta=0)}{Pr(X=0|\theta=1)} = \frac{0.60}{0.05} = 12,$$

so MLE of  $\theta$  is  $\hat{\theta}_{MLE} = 0$ .

#### Bayes:

Similarly, it is easy to see that

$$P(\theta = 0|X = 0) = P(\theta = 0) \left\{ \frac{P(X = 0|\theta = 0)}{P(X = 0)} \right\}$$
  
= 0.3 ×  $\frac{0.60}{0.215}$   
= 0.3 × 2.790698  
= 0.8373093

## Sequential learning

The doctor is still not convinced and decides to perform a second more reliable test (Y):

$$P(Y = 0|\theta = 1) = 0.01$$
 versus  $P(X = 0|\theta = 1) = 0.05$   
 $P(Y = 1|\theta = 0) = 0.04$  versus  $P(X = 1|\theta = 0) = 0.40$ 

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#### Overall rate of positives

Once again, the doctor can anticipate the overall rate of positive tests, but now conditioning on X = 1:

$$P(Y = 1|X = 1) = P(Y = 1|\theta = 0)P(\theta = 0|X = 1) + P(Y = 1|\theta = 1)P(\theta = 1|X = 1) = (0.04)(0.1528662) + (0.99)(0.8471338) = 0.8447771$$

Once again, Bayes rule leads to

$$P(\theta = 1 | X = 1, Y = 1) = P(\theta = 1 | X = 1) \left\{ \frac{P(Y = 1 | \theta = 1)}{P(Y = 1 | X = 1)} \right\}$$
$$= 0.8471338 \times \frac{0.99}{0.8447771}$$
$$= 0.8471338 \times 1.171907$$
$$= 0.992762$$

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Bayesian sequential learning:

$$P(\theta = 1|H) = \begin{cases} 70\% & , H: \text{ before } X \text{ and } Y \\ 85\% & , H: \text{ after } X = 1 \text{ and before } Y \\ 99\% & , H: \text{ after } X = 1 \text{ and } Y = 1 \end{cases}$$

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
Note: It is easy to see that  $Pr(\theta = 1 | Y = 1) = 98.2979\%$ . Conclusion: Don't consider test X, unless it is "cost" free.

Goal: Learn  $\theta$ , a physical quantity.

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
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p(x| heta) for  $heta \in \{600, 700, \dots, 1000\}$ 




## Large and small prior experience Prior A: Physicist A (large experience): $\theta \sim N(900, (20)^2)$

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Prior A: Physicist A (large experience):  $\theta \sim N(900, (20)^2)$ Prior B: Physicist B (not so experienced):  $\theta \sim N(800, (80)^2)$ Joint density:  $p(x, \theta) = p(x|\theta)p(\theta)$ 



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#### Bayesian computation: predictive

Prior:  $\theta \sim N(\theta_0, \tau_0^2)$  (Physicist A:  $\theta_0 = 900, \tau_0 = 20$ ) Model:  $x | \theta \sim N(\theta, \sigma^2)$ 

Predictive:

$$p(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} p(x|\theta) p(\theta) d\theta$$

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
$$p(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\tau_0^2}} e^{-\frac{(\theta-\theta_0)^2}{2\tau_0^2}} d\theta$$
$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(\sigma^2+\tau_0^2)}} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2(\sigma^2+\tau_0^2)}}$$

or

 $x \sim N(\theta_0, \sigma^2 + \tau_0^2)$ 

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## Predictive densities



Bayesian computation: posterior

$$p(\theta|x) = rac{p(x|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(x)} \propto p(x|\theta)p(\theta)$$

such that

$$p(\theta|x) \propto (2\pi\sigma^2)^{-1/2} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} (2\pi\tau_0^2)^{-1/2} e^{-\frac{(\theta-\theta_0)^2}{2\tau_0^2}} \\ \propto \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2} \left[(\theta^2 - 2\theta x)/\sigma^2 + (\theta^2 - 2\theta\theta_0)/\tau_0^2)\right]\right\} \\ \propto \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2\tau_1^2} (\theta-\theta_1)^2\right\}.$$

Therefore,

 $\theta | x \sim N(\theta_1, \tau_1^2)$ 

where

$$\theta_1 = \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2}\right)\theta_0 + \left(\frac{\tau_0^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2}\right)x \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_1^2 = \tau_0^2 \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2}\right)_{37}$$

# Combination of information

$$\pi = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2} \in (0,1)$$

#### Therefore,

$$E(\theta|x) = \pi E(\theta) + (1-\pi)x$$


and

Let

$$V(\theta|x) = \pi V(\theta)$$

When  $\tau_0^2$  is much larger than  $\sigma^2$ ,  $\pi \approx 0$  and the posterior collapses at the observed value x!

Observation: X = 850



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# Posterior (updated) densities


#### Physicist A

Prior:  $\theta \sim N(900, (20)^2)$ Posterior:  $(\theta | X = 850) \sim N(890, (17.9)^2)$ 

#### Physicist B

Prior:  $\theta \sim N(800, (40)^2)$ Posterior:  $(\theta|X = 850) \sim N(840, (35.7)^2)$ 

### Priors and posteriors



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## Summary

Deriving the posterior (via Bayes rule)

 $p( heta|x) \propto p(x| heta)p( heta)$ 

and computing the predictive

$$p(x) = \int_{\Theta} p(x|\theta) p(\theta) d\theta$$

can become very challenging!

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can become very challenging!

Bayesian computation was done on limited, unrealistic models until the Monte Carlo revolution (and the computing revolution) of the late 1980's and early 1990's.

## A more conservative physicist

Prior A: Physicist A (large experience):  $\theta \sim N(900, 400)$ 

Prior B: Physicist B (not so experienced):  $\theta \sim N(800, 1600)$ 

#### A more conservative physicist


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
Prior C: Physicist C (largeR experience):  $\theta \sim t_5(900, 240)$ 

$$V(\text{Prior C}) = \frac{5}{5-2}240 = 400 = V(\text{Prior A})$$

## Prior densities



#### Closer look at the tails



#### Predictive and posterior of physicist C

For model  $x|\theta \sim N(\theta, \sigma^2)$  and prior of  $\theta \sim t_{\nu}(\theta_0, \tau^2)$ ,

$$p(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \frac{\Gamma(\frac{\nu+1}{2})}{\Gamma(\frac{\nu}{2})\sqrt{\pi\nu\tau_0^2}} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\nu} \left(\frac{\theta-\theta_0}{\tau_0}\right)^2\right)^{-\frac{\nu+1}{2}} d\theta$$

is not analytically available.


Similarly,

$$p(\theta|x) \propto \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\} \left(1+\frac{1}{\nu}\frac{(\theta-\theta_0)^2}{\tau_0^2}\right)^{-\frac{\nu+1}{2}}$$

is of no known form.


### Predictives

Monte Carlo approximation<sup>2</sup> to p(x) for physicist C.




## Log predictives

Physicist C has similar knowledge as physicist A, but does not rule out smaller values for x.




## Posteriors for $\boldsymbol{\theta}$

Monte Carlo approximation<sup>3</sup> to  $p(\theta|x)$  for physicist C.



### Log posteriors



### Monte Carlo: a toy example

In what follows, we will see how to approximate integrals and sample from unknown distributions via the well known *Monte Carlo* method.


Let us think about calculating  $\pi = 3.141593\ldots$ 

We could sample a bunch (i = 1, ..., M) of pairs  $(x_i, y_i)$  in the unit square  $(0, 1) \times (0, 1)$  and compute the fraction  $\alpha$  of those pairs satisfying the condition  $x_i^2 + y_i^2 < 1$ . In this case,  $pi = 4\alpha$ .

```
M = 1000
x = runif(M)
y = runif(M)
cond = (x<sup>2</sup>+y<sup>2</sup>)<1
par(mfrow=c(1,2))
plot(x,y)
plot(x[cond],y[cond])
pi.mc = 4*sum(cond)/M
```

 $\pi_{mc} = 3.196$ 

$$\frac{\pi}{4} = \int_0^1 \int_0^{\sqrt{1-x^2}} dy dx$$



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## Monte Carlo: Let us play with M

```
for (i in 1:20){
    x = runif(M)
    y = runif(M)
    cond = (x^2+y^2)<1
    pi.mc = 4*cumsum(cond)/(1:M)
    lines(1:M/1000,pi.mc,col=i)
}</pre>
```

### MC error

