

Modern Bayesian Statistics

Part II: Bayesian inference and computation

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Outline

Bayesian paradigm

Example 1: Is Diego ill?

Example 2: Gaussian measurement error

Bayesian computation: MC and MCMC methods

Monte Carlo integration

Monte Carlo simulation

Gibbs sampler

Metropolis-Hastings algorithm

Let us talk about Bayesian statistics?

stochastic
analysis prior data
Sequential factor
Bayesian
estimation distribution
dynamic **model**
volatility Particle
learning

Bayesian paradigm

- ▶ Combination of different sources/levels of information
- ▶ Sequential update of beliefs
- ▶ A single, coherent framework for
 - ▶ Statistical inference/learning
 - ▶ Model comparison/selection/criticism
 - ▶ Predictive analysis and decision making
- ▶ Drawback: Computationally challenging

Example 1: Is Diego ill?

- ▶ Diego claims some discomfort and goes to his doctor.
- ▶ His doctor **believes** he might be ill (he may have the flu).
- ▶ $\theta = 1$: Diego is ill.
- ▶ $\theta = 0$: Diego is not ill.
- ▶ θ is the “state of nature” or “proposition”

Adding some modeling

The doctor can take a **binary and imperfect** “test” X in order to **learn** about θ :

$$\begin{cases} P(X = 1|\theta = 0) = 0.40, & \text{false positive} \\ P(X = 0|\theta = 1) = 0.05, & \text{false negative} \end{cases}$$

These numbers might be based, say, on observed frequencies over the years and over several hospital in a given region.

$X = 1$ is observed

Data collection

The doctor performs the test and observes $X = 1$.

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Decision making

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Maximum likelihood argument

$X = 1$ is more likely from a ill patient than from a healthy one

$$\frac{P(X = 1|\theta = 1)}{P(X = 1|\theta = 0)} = \frac{0.95}{0.40} = 2.375$$

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The **maximum likelihood estimator** of θ is $\hat{\theta}_{MLE} = 1$.

Bayesian learning

Suppose the doctor claims that

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Overall rate of positives

The doctor can anticipate the overall rate of positive tests:

$$\begin{aligned}P(X = 1) &= P(X = 1|\theta = 0)P(\theta = 0) \\ &+ P(X = 1|\theta = 1)P(\theta = 1) \\ &= (0.4)(0.3) + (0.95)(0.7) = 0.785\end{aligned}$$

Turning the Bayesian crank

Once $X = 1$ is observed, i.e. once Diego is submitted to the test X and the outcome is $X = 1$, what is the probability that Diego is ill?

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Correct answer: $P(\theta = 1|X = 1)$

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Correct answer: $P(\theta = 1|X = 1)$

Simple probability identity (Bayes' rule):

$$\begin{aligned}P(\theta = 1|X = 1) &= P(\theta = 1) \left\{ \frac{P(X = 1|\theta = 1)}{P(X = 1)} \right\} \\ &= 0.70 \times \frac{0.95}{0.785} \\ &= 0.70 \times 1.210191 \\ &= 0.8471338\end{aligned}$$

Combining both pieces of information

By combining

existing information (prior) + model/data (likelihood)

the updated (posterior) probability that Diego is ill is 85%.

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More generally,

$$\text{posterior} = \frac{\text{prior} \times \text{likelihood}}{\text{predictive}}$$

What if instead $X = 0$?

Maximum likelihood:

$X = 0$ is more likely from a healthy patient than from an ill one

$$\frac{P(X = 0|\theta = 0)}{Pr(X = 0|\theta = 1)} = \frac{0.60}{0.05} = 12,$$

so MLE of θ is $\hat{\theta}_{MLE} = 0$.

Bayes:

Similarly, it is easy to see that

$$\begin{aligned}P(\theta = 0|X = 0) &= P(\theta = 0) \left\{ \frac{P(X = 0|\theta = 0)}{P(X = 0)} \right\} \\ &= 0.3 \times \frac{0.60}{0.215} \\ &= 0.3 \times 2.790698 \\ &= 0.8373093\end{aligned}$$

Sequential learning

The doctor is still not convinced and decides to perform a second more reliable test (Y):

$$P(Y = 0|\theta = 1) = 0.01 \quad \text{versus} \quad P(X = 0|\theta = 1) = 0.05$$

$$P(Y = 1|\theta = 0) = 0.04 \quad \text{versus} \quad P(X = 1|\theta = 0) = 0.40$$

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Overall rate of positives

Once again, the doctor can anticipate the overall rate of positive tests, but now conditioning on $X = 1$:

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y = 1|X = 1) &= P(Y = 1|\theta = 0)P(\theta = 0|X = 1) \\ &+ P(Y = 1|\theta = 1)P(\theta = 1|X = 1) \\ &= (0.04)(0.1528662) + (0.99)(0.8471338) \\ &= 0.8447771 \end{aligned}$$

$Y = 1$ is observed

Once again, Bayes rule leads to

$$\begin{aligned}P(\theta = 1|X = 1, Y = 1) &= P(\theta = 1|X = 1) \left\{ \frac{P(Y = 1|\theta = 1)}{P(Y = 1|X = 1)} \right\} \\&= 0.8471338 \times \frac{0.99}{0.8447771} \\&= 0.8471338 \times 1.171907 \\&= 0.992762\end{aligned}$$

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Bayesian sequential learning:

$$P(\theta = 1|H) = \begin{cases} 70\% & , H: \text{before } X \text{ and } Y \\ 85\% & , H: \text{after } X = 1 \text{ and before } Y \\ 99\% & , H: \text{after } X = 1 \text{ and } Y = 1 \end{cases}$$

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Note: It is easy to see that $Pr(\theta = 1|Y = 1) = 98.2979\%$.

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Conclusion: Don't consider test X , unless it is "cost" free.

Example 2: Gaussian measurement error

Goal: Learn θ , a physical quantity.

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
Model: $(X|\theta) \sim N(\theta, (40)^2)$

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
Goal: Learn θ , a physical quantity.

Measurement: X

Model: $(X|\theta) \sim N(\theta, (40)^2)$



$p(x|\theta)$ for $\theta \in \{600, 700, \dots, 1000\}$



Large and small prior experience

Prior A: Physicist A (large experience): $\theta \sim N(900, (20)^2)$

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Prior B: Physicist B (not so experienced): $\theta \sim N(800, (80)^2)$


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
Prior B: Physicist B (not so experienced): $\theta \sim N(800, (80)^2)$

Joint density: $p(x, \theta) = p(x|\theta)p(\theta)$

Physicist A



Physicist B



Bayesian computation: predictive

Prior: $\theta \sim N(\theta_0, \tau_0^2)$

(Physicist A: $\theta_0 = 900$, $\tau_0 = 20$)

Model: $x|\theta \sim N(\theta, \sigma^2)$

Predictive:

$$p(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} p(x|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta$$

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
Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} p(x) &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\tau_0^2}} e^{-\frac{(\theta-\theta_0)^2}{2\tau_0^2}} d\theta \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2)}} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta_0)^2}{2(\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2)}} \end{aligned}$$

or

$$x \sim N(\theta_0, \sigma^2 + \tau_0^2)$$

Predictive densities



Bayesian computation: posterior

$$p(\theta|x) = \frac{p(x|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(x)} \propto p(x|\theta)p(\theta)$$

such that

$$\begin{aligned} p(\theta|x) &\propto (2\pi\sigma^2)^{-1/2} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} (2\pi\tau_0^2)^{-1/2} e^{-\frac{(\theta-\theta_0)^2}{2\tau_0^2}} \\ &\propto \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{\sigma^2} + \frac{(\theta-\theta_0)^2}{\tau_0^2}\right]\right\} \\ &\propto \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2\tau_1^2}(\theta-\theta_1)^2\right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\theta|x \sim N(\theta_1, \tau_1^2)$$

where

$$\theta_1 = \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2}\right)\theta_0 + \left(\frac{\tau_0^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2}\right)x \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_1^2 = \tau_0^2 \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2}\right)$$

Combination of information

Let

$$\pi = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_0^2} \in (0, 1)$$

Therefore,

$$E(\theta|x) = \pi E(\theta) + (1 - \pi)x$$


and

$$V(\theta|x) = \pi V(\theta)$$


When τ_0^2 is much larger than σ^2 , $\pi \approx 0$ and the posterior collapses at the observed value x !

Observation: $X = 850$

Physicist A



Physicist B



Posterior (updated) densities

Physicist A

Prior: $\theta \sim N(900, (20)^2)$

Posterior: $(\theta|X = 850) \sim N(890, (17.9)^2)$


Physicist B

Prior: $\theta \sim N(800, (40)^2)$


Posterior: $(\theta|X = 850) \sim N(840, (35.7)^2)$

Priors and posteriors

Physicist A



Physicist B



Summary

Deriving the posterior (via Bayes rule)

$$p(\theta|x) \propto p(x|\theta)p(\theta)$$

and computing the predictive

$$p(x) = \int_{\Theta} p(x|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta$$

can become very challenging!

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Bayesian computation was done on limited, unrealistic models until the Monte Carlo revolution (and the computing revolution) of the late 1980's and early 1990's.

A more conservative physicist

Prior A: Physicist A (large experience): $\theta \sim N(900, 400)$

Prior B: Physicist B (not so experienced): $\theta \sim N(800, 1600)$

A more conservative physicist


Prior A: Physicist A (large experience): $\theta \sim N(900, 400)$

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
Prior C: Physicist C (largeR experience): $\theta \sim t_5(900, 240)$

$$V(\text{Prior C}) = \frac{5}{5-2}240 = 400 = V(\text{Prior A})$$

Prior densities



Closer look at the tails



Predictive and posterior of physicist C

For model $x|\theta \sim N(\theta, \sigma^2)$ and prior of $\theta \sim t_\nu(\theta_0, \tau^2)$,

$$p(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} e^{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \frac{\Gamma(\frac{\nu+1}{2})}{\Gamma(\frac{\nu}{2})\sqrt{\pi\nu\tau_0^2}} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\nu} \left(\frac{\theta - \theta_0}{\tau_0}\right)^2\right)^{-\frac{\nu+1}{2}} d\theta$$

is not analytically available.


Similarly,

$$p(\theta|x) \propto \exp\left\{-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\nu} \frac{(\theta - \theta_0)^2}{\tau_0^2}\right)^{-\frac{\nu+1}{2}}$$

is of no known form.


Predictives

Monte Carlo approximation to $p(x)$ for physicist C.




Log predictives

Physicist C has similar knowledge as physicist A, but does not rule out smaller values for x .




Posteriors for θ

Monte Carlo approximation to $p(\theta|x)$ for physicist C.



Log posteriors



Monte Carlo integration

The integral

$$p(x) = \int p(x|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta = E_{p(\theta)}\{p(x|\theta)\}$$

can be approximated by Monte Carlo as

$$\hat{p}_{MC}(x) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M p(x|\theta^{(i)})$$

where

$$\{\theta^{(1)}, \dots, \theta^{(M)}\} \sim p(\theta)$$

We used $M = 1,000,000$ draws in the previous two plots.

Monte Carlo simulation via SIR

Sampling importance resampling (SIR) is a well-known MC tool that resamples draws from a candidate density $q(\cdot)$ to obtain draws from a target density $\pi(\cdot)$.

SIR Algorithm:

1. Draws $\{\theta^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^M$ from candidate density $q(\cdot)$
2. Compute resampling weights: $w^{(i)} \propto \pi(\theta^{(i)})/q(\theta^{(i)})$
3. Sample $\{\tilde{\theta}^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^N$ from $\{\theta^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^M$ with weights $\{w^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^M$.

Result: $\{\tilde{\theta}^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{\theta}^{(N)}\} \sim \pi(\theta)$

Bayesian bootstrap

When ...

- ▶ the **target density** is the **posterior** $p(\theta|x)$, and
- ▶ the **candidate density** is the **prior** $p(\theta)$, then
- ▶ the **weight** is the **likelihood** $p(x|\theta)$:

$$w^{(i)} \propto \frac{p(\theta^{(i)})p(x|\theta^{(i)})}{p(\theta^{(i)})} = p(x|\theta^{(i)})$$

Note: We used $M = 10^6$ and $N = 0.1M$ in the previous two plots.

MC is expensive!

Exact solution

$$I = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \exp\{-0.5\theta^2\} d\theta = \sqrt{2\pi} = 2.506628275$$

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Let us assume that

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Grid approximation (less than 0.01 seconds to run)

For $\theta_1 = -5$, $\theta_2 = -5 + \Delta$, \dots , $\theta_{1001} = 5$ and $\Delta = 0.01$,

$$\hat{I}_{hist} = \sum_{i=1}^{1001} \exp\{-0.5\theta_i^2\} \Delta = 2.506626875$$

MC integration

It is easy to see that

$$\begin{aligned}\int_{-5}^5 \exp\{-0.5\theta^2\} d\theta &= \int_{-5}^5 10 \exp\{-0.5\theta^2\} \frac{1}{10} d\theta \\ &= E_{U(-5,5)} [10 \exp\{-0.5\theta^2\}] \end{aligned}$$

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Therefore, for $\{\theta^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^M \sim U(-5, 5)$,

$$\hat{I}_{MC} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M 10 \exp\{-0.5\theta^{(i)2}\}$$

M	\hat{I}_{MC}	MC error
1,000	2.505392026	0.10640840352
10,000	2.507470696	0.03380205878
100,000	2.506948869	0.01067906810

To improve on digital point, one needs M^2 draws!

It takes about 0.02 seconds to run.

Monte Carlo methods

- ▶ They are expensive.
- ▶ They are scalable.
- ▶ Readily available MC error bounds.

Why not simply use deterministic approximations?

Let us consider the bidimensional integral, for $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)$,

$$I = \int \exp\{-0.5\theta'\theta\}d\theta = (2\pi)^{3/2} = 15.74960995$$

Grid approximation (20 seconds)

$$\hat{I}_{hist} = \sum_{i=1}^{1001} \sum_{j=1}^{1001} \sum_{k=1}^{1001} \exp\{-0.5(\theta_{1i}^2 + \theta_{2j}^2 + \theta_{3k}^2)\} \Delta^3 = 15.74958355$$

Monte Carlo approximation (0.02 seconds)

M	\hat{I}_{MC}	MC error
1,000	15.75223328	2.2768286659
10,000	15.72907660	0.7515860214
100,000	15.75368350	0.2236006764

Gibbs sampler

The **Gibbs sampler** is the most famous of the **Markov chain Monte Carlo** methods.

Roughly speaking, one can sample from the joint posterior of $(\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)$

$$p(\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3 | y)$$

by iteratively sampling from the **full conditional distributions**

$$p(\theta_1 | \theta_2, \theta_3, y)$$


$$p(\theta_2 | \theta_1, \theta_3, y)$$

$$p(\theta_3 | \theta_1, \theta_2, y)$$

After a *warm up* phase, the draws will behave as coming from posterior distribution.

Target distribution: bivariate normal with $\rho = 0.6$





$$p(x, y) = \frac{1}{2\pi\sqrt{1-\rho^2}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{x^2 - 2\rho xy - y^2}{2(1-\rho^2)} \right\}$$



Full conditional distributions


Easy to see that $x|y \sim N(\rho y, 1 - \rho^2)$ and $y|x \sim N(\rho x, 1 - \rho^2)$.

Initial value: $x^{(0)} = 4$





Posterior draws

Running the Gibbs sampler for 11,000 iterations and discarding the first 1,000 draws.



Marginal posterior distributions



Metropolis-Hastings algorithm

The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is, in fact, more general than the Gibbs sampler and older (1950's).

One can sample from the joint posterior $p(\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3|y)$ by iteratively sampling θ_1^* from a proposal density $q_1(\cdot)$ and accepting the draw with probability





$$\min \left\{ 1, \frac{p(\theta_1^*, \theta_2, \theta_3|y) q_1(\theta_1)}{p(\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3|y) q_1(\theta_1^*)} \right\},$$

with θ_2 and θ_3 fixed at the final draws from the previous iteration. The steps are repeated for θ_2^* and θ_3^* .

After a *warm up* phase, the draws will behave as coming from posterior distribution.


Random-walk Metropolis algorithm

The proposals are $x^* \sim N(x^{old}, 0.25)$ and $y^* \sim N(y^{old}, 0.25)$





Posterior draws


Running the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm for 11,000 iterations and discarding the first 1,000 draws.



Marginal posterior distributions



Markov chains and autocorrelation



Want to learn more?

hedibert.org has a link to book webpage.

